Islamism and nationalism among niqabis women in Egypt and Indonesia by Dzuhayatin, Siti Ruhaini
49
Islamism and nationalism among 
niqabis women in Egypt and 
Indonesia
Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin
Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta
E-mail: siti.dzuhayatin@uin-suka.ac.id
DOI: 10.18326/ijims.v10i1.49-77
Abstract
The phenomenon of the increasing number of niqabis in Indonesia and Egypt 
has become concern to the government, academics and also civil society. This 
is due to the involvement of the niqabis or women with the niqab in terrorist 
networks. The piece of clothing covering the face is not merely a manifestation 
of faith but it apparently entails a certain ideological doctrine of the so-called 
Islam kaffah (ultimate Islam) through the establishemnt of Islamic khilafah 
(Islamic caliphate) as opposed to democracy and modern state. This study aims at 
observing the extent to which the niqabis negotiate Islam and their nationalism 
in their respective countries in Indonesia and Egypt where Muslims constitute the 
majority of the population. This study employed a mix of methods, qualitative and 
quantitative, involving 205 Niqabis from Indonesia and 87 niqabis from Egypt. 
The quantitative data were obtained from 292 respondents, while the qualitiative 
data were collected from 27 niqabis using in-depth interviews through life story 
technique—6 Egyptians and 21 Indonesians. A number of 12 prominent figures 
in Egypt and  Indonesia were interviewed and two focus group discussions were 
conducted in both countries involving women activists, academics, government 
employees, and religious leaders. The framework of this study is the contestation 
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between Islamism and nationalism. This study indicated that there is a significant 
difference between the niqabis of Indonesia and Egypt in terms of their perception 
of national pride. Around 30 percent of Indonesian niqabis are not proud of 
being Indonesian citizens while in Egypt only about 3 percent.  Bank interest is 
used to measure their Islamic refinement through which Niqabis in both countries 
share a similar view, where almost 90% of them believe that the practice is not 
Islamic. Moreover,  more than 50% support the Caliphate system, which means 
that one in four niqabis considers that the existing government is thoghut (non 
Islamic) and nearly 15% agree to defend Islam by means of violence.
Fenomena berkembangnya niqabis di Indonesia dan Mesir menjadi perhatian 
seksama pemerintah, akademisi dan juga masyarakat sipil. Hal ini disebabkan 
keterlibatan perempuan dalam jaringan teroris yang umumnya menggunakan 
niqab, sehingga diduga bahwa selembar kain penutup wajah ini tidak semata 
simbul ketaqwaan tetapi ada bagian dari doktrin ideologi yang melawan sistem 
yang ada. Pada umumnya, ideologi ini bermaksud mendirikan sistem caliphate 
yang dilawankan dengan demokrasi dan bentuk negara republik. Penelitian ini 
bertujuan untuk mengetahui sejauhmana tingkat Islamisme dan nasionalisme 
para niqabis di Indonesia dan Mesir, sebagai negara dengan mayoritas Muslim. 
Penelitian ini menggunakan mix-methode, kualitatif dan kuantitatif yang 
melibatkan 205 Niqabis dari Indonesia dan 87 niqabis dari Mesir. Data kuantitatif 
diperoleh dari 209 responden melalui kuesioner sedangkan data kualitatif 
diperoleh melalui wawancara mendalam dengan teknis kisah hidup sebanyak 27, 
6 Niqabis Mesir dan 21 Niqabis Indonesia.  Disamping itu, dilakukan wawancara 
dengan  12 tokoh dan dilaksanakan dua diskusi terfokus dengan  politisi, aktivis 
perempuan, akademisi, pegawai pemerintah, dan pemimpin agama. Penelitian 
ini menggunakan kerangka kerja kontestasi Islamisme dan nasionalisme yang 
menunjukan hasil sebagai berikut: ada perbedaan signifikan antara niqabis kedua 
negara pada aspek kebanggaan sebagai warga negara. Hampir 30 persen niqabis 
Indonesia tidak bangga menjadi WNI sedangkan di Mesir hanya sekitar 3 persen. 
Jasa Bank digunakan untuk mengukur kehidupan Islami yang  menunjukkan 
kecenderungan sama, meski dengan prosentase yang sedikit berbeda, yaitu lebih 
dari 90% tidak setuju dengan bunga bank.  Terkait dengan politik,  lebih dari 
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50% setuju dengan sistem caliphate dan 1 dari 4 niqabis setuju bahwa pemerintah 
saat ini thoghut dan sekitar 15 orang setuju menggunakan kekerasan dalam 
membela negara.
Keywords: Niqabis; Islamism; Nationalism; Caliphate 
Introduction
Women issues, ranging from their identities, roles, positions and even 
personal choices, continue being contested so long as their voices are 
not heard and their autonomy is not recognized. According to Kumari 
Jayawardena, Feminists remain critical on how women are postulated 
in socio-cultural, economics, politics as well as religion in the major 
patriarchal narrative.1 Women are constantly in a dilemma on how to 
control their own bodies, including the choice of dressing or covering 
their bodies. Feminist theories started questioning control over body 
as the fundamental ground for claiming their personal authorities as 
strongly advocated by Kate Millett in seeing body and sex as part of power 
relationships and personal contacts on th recognized political structruces.2 
Conal Hanisch, known as the initiator of the very famous campaign on ‘the 
personal is political,’ claims that women authority, including appreance, is 
recognized as personal autonomy.3 Fatima Mernissi asserted that the veil 
in the Muslim world is often used in misogynistic patriarchal tradition 
to curb  women’s right and participation in the modern and democratic 
world.4 It is interesting to observe where women’s outfits such as veil, 
1Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in The Third World: In The 19th and Early 
20th Centuries, The Hague, Netherlands: Institute of Social Studies, 1982.
2Kate Millett, Sexual Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970, 24-25.
3Carol Hanich, The Personal is Political, www.carolhanisch.org  downloaded 22 february 
2019. See also Frances Rogan and Shelley Budgeon, “The Personal is Political: Assessing 
Feminist Fundamentals in the Digital Age”, Journal of Social Science, vol. 7, no. 132 (2008), 2-3.
4Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and The Male Elite; A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights 
in, Islam, New York: Persues Book Publications, 1992, 7-8. 
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niqab, and others fit into the views of personal autonomy of Millett and 
Hanisch and the patriachal control over women’s body. 
Moreover, the question on women’s outfit emerged along with women 
emancipation following the democratization process in the Muslim world. 
Access to education, changing roles, and even the shift to modern clothing 
as part of emancipation were approved as long as it supports the grand 
patriarchal narrative with all its arguments to control women. For example, 
the emancipation of women in the non-Western world should be different 
from that of the West because of the nobility and glory that is held in 
high esteem.5 Jayawardena’s thesis is also reflected in the views of female 
emancipation figures in Indonesia, such as Kartini, or in Egypt—Huda 
Sha’arawi. Jayawardena’s thesis is still relevant to women’s issues today 
when patriarchy is embedded in cultural hegemony,  state power,  global 
economy as well as religious authority. 
In general, post-colonial Muslim societies are generally accepting a 
modern concept and finding religious grounds in the Islamic traditions, 
including the concept of nation-state and democracy that is friendly to 
Islam, legal system as well as modern outfits which are nicely combined 
with the Islamic element of hijab,  even with the enduing debates and 
contestations6. The image of the niqab worsened when the media labeled 
veiled women as terrorist wives or terrorist members. In countries where 
Muslims are a minority, the niqab is seen not only as a black cloth covering 
the heads and faces of women, but also religious, social, and political 
fanaticism. European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands have officially banned the use of 
niqab in public places because it is considered to express certain religious 
symbols and socio-political status. In other secular countries, even though 
5Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism…, 12-15.
6Abdullahi Ahmed an Naim, Negotiating the Future of Sharia,  Islam and the Secular State, 
Maasachussetts: Harvard University Press, 2008,  267–72.
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the niqab is not banned, the phenomenon of veiled Muslim women is 
always exposed to prejudice.7
This study aimed at comparing the two countries where Muslims are the 
majority: Indonesia and Egypt while posing a question on how women’s 
voice and choice are contested and negotiated by patriarchy, religion, and 
nationalism with specific variables of the Islamic character and the nation 
state in multi-cultural contexts of Egypt and Indonesia. The choice of 
women as the focus of this study has to do with the issue of women’s outfit, 
a very central aspect of the Islamic tradition that has a huge influence 
in other social dimensions, such as segregation, power relations, access, 
participation, and attainment of the benefits of development and progress.
It focuses on the meaning attached to a certain cloth closely identified 
with religious teaching and state ideology, especially in the post-colonial 
era. The contesting relations between West and East (read Islam) leads 
to a variety of patterns arranging from an antagonistic view of the 
incompatibility between Western modernization and Islamic tradition. 
This selective-constructive relationship harmoniously brings up a rational 
element of the two traditions that inspire a modern Muslim political system 
and a view about the total compatibility between the rational elements of 
Islam and the West. 
Islamophobia and the incessant publications related to terrorism that 
hides behind the mask of Islam may have contributed to the emergence of 
‘fear’ for attributes that are too prominent in the Islamic side. The Niqab 
is seen as displaying a fundamentalist attitude—as narrow fanaticism in 
the midst of diversity. Lintang Ratri said that veiled women experience 
twofold discrimination—marginalized as women and veil wearers, who are 
more marginalized8. Discourse about the niqab as a cloth covering aurat 
7Lexandra Gouveia, 10 Countries Where Women Are Forbidden To Wear The Veil (Juli 2017), 
https://emirateswoman.com/10-countries-women-forbidden-wear-veil/.
8Lintang Ratri, “Cadar, Media, dan Identitas Perempuan Muslim”, Jurnal FORUM 
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on the one hand with religious symbols is often marked by a negative 
image and, on the other hand, makes the study of the niqab something 
very important. The notion that the niqab is an expression of clothing 
representing the radical thinking of its owner needs to be revisited and 
further investigated. Examining the internal side of niqab women related 
to their views on Islam, their opinions on radicalism issues, as well as how 
they define themselves as niqab Muslims and citizens will certainly help 
uncover the stereotypical forms that often surround veiled women. This 
paper explores the internal views of women using the niqab or niqabis 
and places it in the socio-political spectrum where they live.
Islamism as a religious ideology
There are four types of Muslims, from violence-prone extremist jihadist 
core to more peaceful Muslims: Jihadist Muslims, Islamist Muslims, 
Conservative Muslims, and Pluralist Muslims.9 Jihadist Muslims: They 
want to impose their interpretation of Islam on all others by threat or 
use of force in order to achieve the others’ submission and conversion. 
They are also the most militant and are mainly interested in fighting the 
‘near enemy.’ Islamist Muslims: They may not practice violence but often 
adhere to the same, or a similar, fundamentalist and exclusivist ideology 
as the jihadist terrorists. In principle, they are opposed to pluralism, but 
for practical and pragmatic reasons, they opt for coexistence with other 
political parties. Conservative Muslims: They tend not to view Islam 
as a political ideology and are not revolutionary. They can be referred 
to as traditional Muslims. Pluralist Muslims: They adhere to a broader 
interpretation of what it means to be Islamic and are inclusivists rather than 
exclusivists regarding various expressions of their faith and its relationship 
Universitas Diponegoro, Volume 39, Number 2 (2011), 29–37.
9Alex P. Schmid, “Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and 
Resistance”, The Hague, vol.  8, No. 9 (2017).  
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with other faiths. They include ‘modern Muslims,’ ‘cultural Muslims,’ 
‘sociological Muslims,’ ‘liberal Muslims,’ ‘reformist Muslims,’ ‘progressive 
Muslims,’ ‘Western Muslims,’ ‘Muslim democrats,’ and the ‘Muslim left.’ 
Based upon the aforementioned classification, the first to the 
third group tend to close to Islamism. The word Islamism has various 
definitions. But, in general, the term Islamism appears as a substitute 
for the term fundamentalism and the term political Islam, which tends 
to be stigmatic10. Islamism is a visionary movement set to shape world 
records based upon religion and allows violence, which has six spectrums 
namely: 1) Purification of Islam, 2) Formalization of Islamic Sharia, 3) 
Anti-Democracy, 4) Anti-other religions, 5) Anti-Western culture and 6) 
Agree to use violence for achieving the goals.11 Meanwhile, Oliver Roy 
defines Islamism as the new name of Modern Islamic politics that wants to 
create an Islamic society (Ummah) and Islamic countries through political 
actions and enforces the formalization of Islamic sharia.12
In Indonesia, Islamism existed long before independence. However, 
when the New Order operated illegally and since the reformation era, 
Islamism has gained space to exist and develop until it is legally included 
in political parties13 In Egypt, the Islamist group shifted their strategy from 
Salafi preaching to political preaching14 and their movement failed to 
integrate their ideas in the real political domain. Failure of integration in 
10Muhammad Wildan et.al. , Menanam Benih di Ladang Tandus:Potret Sistem Produksi Guru 
Agama Islam di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: CISForm UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2019,  6.
11Bassam Tibi , Islamism and Islam. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
12Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia: Columbia University 
Press, 2004.
13Moch Nur Ichwan, “Islamisme, Pos-Islamisme, dan Reposisi Islam Mainstream: Sebuah 
Pendahuluan”, in Islamisme dan Pos-Islamisme: Dalam Dinamika Politik Indonesia Kontemporer, 
Moch Nur Ichwan and Muhammad Wildan (eds.), Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press-CISForm UIN 
Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2019, 9-10.
14Naïma Bouras,  “From Salafi Preaching to Political Preaching: Women’s Turnout and 
the Evolution of Salafi Movements in Egypt”, Gender, Volume 9, Number 1 (2017), 30-45.
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both political and social life fueled further exclusivism.15 The construction 
of meaning at the level of implementation of issues and symbols is of 
paramount importance when discussing Islamism. The circles of political 
Islam “believe that Islam must be realized symbolically in politics, while the 
substantive Islamic circles are in opposition to the presence of the Islamic 
party and the symbolization of shari’ah by the State”.16 One of the ways 
to express their identity of piety, completion, and obedience to God is by 
wearing a niqab. Many niqabis are aware that they are different from non-
niqabis by expressing their symbol of the completion (kaffah) of their life.
When discussing Islamism, patriarchy becomes quite relevant because 
Islamism movements, in general, are tough masculine politics with a heavy-
militaristic pattern, security-approach, majority-authoritarian, patriarchal 
with strict gender segregation and demanding women submissions. One 
product of the patriarchal structure among the Salafi movement is that it 
obliges women to wear the niqab.17 Among Salafi groups, men usually have 
the privilege to force women to use the niqab.18 ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq 
and al-Sham, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) requires its female members 
to wear niqab. When they occupied the city of Mosul in Iraq, ISIS required 
that all Mosul women wear niqab when leaving the house19. According to 
some Muslim women, wearing the niqab will protect them from men who 
15Christina DeGregorio, “Islamism in Politics: Integration and Persecution in Egypt”, Al 
Ja-mi‘ah, Volume 48, Number 2 (2010), 343-64.
16Syahrir Karim, “Islamism: Expression of Political Islam and Islamic Politics in South 
Sulawesi”, JICSA, Volume 05, Number 02 (2016),  122.
17Ellen McLarney, “The burqa in Vogue: Fashioning Afghanistan”, Journal of Middle East 
Women’s Studies, Volume 5, Number 1 (2009),  1–23.
18Knutilla, “Lean and Mean: Hegemonic Masculinity as Fundamentalism”, in Contesting 
Fundamentalism, ed. by J. Jaffe, & A. M. Watkinson Eds C. Schick. Nova Scotia: Fernwood 
Publishing, 2004; Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in 
Post-New Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006.
19Rukmini Callimachi, For Women Under ISIS, a Tyranny of Dress Code and Punishment 
(Desember 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/world/middleeast/islamic-state-
mosul-women-dress-code-morality.html.
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have malevolent intentions regarding their bodies. This is in accordance 
with Surah Al-Azhab verse 59, which seeks to protect women from male 
lust. For niqabis, wearing a veil makes her feel more secure and able to live 
her identity as a Muslim woman.20 However, in many cases, wearing the 
niqab places Muslim women at the center of attention, targets of hatred, 
victims of stereotypes, and victims of discrimination.21 Discrimination 
against veiled women occurs in domestic and international spheres. In 
various regions in Indonesia, including big cities, Muslim women who wear 
the niqab still trigger negative reactions from the surrounding community. 
Veiled women are often associated with fanaticism toward religion, often 
even considered a radical Islamic group.22 As one niqabi confessed working 
in Central Jakarta, TSN gets a negative reaction from people who see her 
wearing a veil. Reactions include being thrown bottles at and yelled at 
words like ninja, terrorist, thief, and ghost.23 Another niqabi experienced 
discrimination that is commonly shared by veiled women in Indonesia, 
including difficulties abroad because of the long process of immigration 
and interrogation. They were accused or suspected of being members of 
terrorists, so they were closely examined, while it is forbidden to wear the 
veil in various companies and educational institutions, and receive words 
of sarcasm from others.24
20Sudrajat, Jilbab di Indonesia, Antara Pelarangan dan Perjuangan (7 Mar 2018), https://news.
detik.com/berita/d-3903674/jilbab-di-indonesia-antara-pelarangan-dan-perjuangan.
21Lamya Kaddor, “Kenapa Saya Sebagai Perempuan Muslim Tidak Berjilbab”, Deutsche 
Welle (2018), https://www.dw.com/id/kenapa-saya-sebagai-perempuan-muslim-tidak-
berjilbab/a-43418026.
22Resti Amanda & Mardianto, “Hubungan Antara Prasangka Masyarakat Terhadap 
Muslimah Bercadar Dengan Jarak Sosial”, Jurnal RAP UNP, Volume 5, Number 1 (2014), 72-81.
23Amanda Siddharta, Mengapa Niqab (Makin) Banyak Digunakan oleh Wanita Muslim 
di Indonesia (20 Feb 2018), https://www.matamatapolitik.com/mengapa-niqab-banyak-
digunakan-oleh-wanita-muslim-di-indonesia/.
24Dwi Retno Cahyaningrum & Dinie Ratri Desiningrum, “Jiwa-Jiwa Tenang Bertabir 
Iman: Studi Fenomenologi Pada Mahasiswi Bercadar di Universitas Negeri Umum Kota 
Yogyakarta”, Jurnal Empati, Volume 7, Number 3 (2017), 278-96.
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Debate on covering aurat
In the beginning, the emancipation of women through education 
sparked controversy, which has still lingered because it pushes further to 
the question of other rights, such as working, leadership, and refusing 
polygamy. More problematic is the issue of women’s outfits in all its 
forms, starting from the headscarf (jilbab) in the early 1980s to the niqab 
today. The main issue is not merely a matter of how women choose it but 
a movement that is driven by religious ideology or the so-called Islamism, 
which usually contests against the existing government and mainstream 
social system. Roy argues that Islamism is not resurfacing in order to rescue 
the religious decline but obviously responding to the crisis between religion 
and politics and religion with the state and the fragmentation of religious 
identity and authority.25 In such instability and social unrest, women and 
minority groups are the vulnerable target.
Hijab was eventually accepted in the early 1980s. With a harmonious 
modification and adjustment, it revealed a new identity of modern-Muslim 
women coupled with a modern outfit such as fashional long skirts and 
pants. Niqab seems to take a similar road considered the continuum 
of hijab in order to obtain the perfection of piety.26 Hijab and modern 
outfit have become not sufficient enough to represent the true Islamic 
woman in the last 20 years or so. Hijab in the form of a scarf covering the 
head, beautifully wrapped around the neck with fancy accessories and in 
harmony with charming facial makeup, started to be extended and loosely 
covered the chest with dark and gloomy colors of black, dark blue, and 
dark brown without makeup. This is what came to be referred to as “Syar’i 
Jilbab” (More Islamic hijab) against the fashionable veil. Moreover, in the 
25Oliver Roy, Islam: A Passage to the West: Globalized Islam: The Search for A New Ummah, 
London: Hurst and Company, 2002,  2-4.
26Alimatul Qibtiyah, Hijab in Indonesia: The History and Controversies, The Conversation 
(2019), The Conversation http://theconversation.com.
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last 10 years, the Syar’i Jilbab has eventually been considered an imperfect 
Islamic garment because it still displays the face, which is believed to be 
a female’s sexual attraction. 
In fact, there is a loose definition of covering the body in Islam. Covers 
range from fashionable veil, long-veil, and niqab, which is constantly 
debated among Islamic scholars. The leading Indonesian scholars 
Quraisy Syihab, Al Azhar graduate, argued that covering the body in 
Islam is contextual depending upon the social acceptance of modesty and 
refinement.  Traditional or national outfits usually worn by the Indonesian 
leading women without covering the head do not substantially conflict with 
religious teachings.27  There are also Egyptian scholars, such as Hamdallah 
Hafidz al Shafty, Director of the Office of Culture and International 
Alumni Association, Al Azhar University, Cairo Egypt, who argues that 
there was no such a single standard of the Muslim outfits even in the 
time of the Prophet where many kinds of clothing from Rome, Persia, 
and Coptic tradition were found28. Nowadays, fashionable hijab is widely 
accepted as the moderate expression of Islamic outfit but long-loose Jilbab 
and niqab have envoked controversies not only in the West but also in 
Muslim countries like Indonesia and Egypt. The reaction toward niqab 
seems to be more obvious than the hijab; the Egyptian government has 
recently announced to plan banning niqab in the public places for security 
reasons as well as the prevention of extremism and terrorism, which are the 
country’s dauting issues.29 There are at least 10 coutries including some 
27Quraish Shihab, Wawasan al-Qur’an: Tafsir Mawdhu’i atas Berbagai Persoalan Umat, 
Bandung: Mizan, 1996, 179; Quraish Shihab, Tafsir Al-Misbah: Pesan, Kesan dan Keserasian 
al-Qur’an Jakarta: Lentera Hati, cetakan 6, Jilid 5 dan 9, 2006, 332–4.
28Hamdallah Hafidz Al Shafty, interview (1 Oct 2018).
29Amr Emam, Battle of the niqab moves to Egypt: Lawmakers are seeking to link a ban to security 
concerns, not wider political or social issues. (2018), https://thearabweekly.com/battle-niqab-
moves-egypt.
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Muslim-majority countries where women are not allowed to wear niqab.30
Indonesia has been struck by the rapid growth of niqab along with 
the new trend of “hijrah” (moving) among celebrities guided by some 
newly returnist scholars from Middle East universities suspected to have 
strong affiliations with Islamic hardliners, such as Hizbu Tahrir (the Army 
of liberation), Ichwanul Muslimin, or even the Extremist supporters of 
ISIS and other similar ones. Those groups have been known as Salafi 
(conservative) in religious thought—an Islamist group, whose main political 
ideology and mission are the establishing of the so-called “Islamic State,” 
of which Iran is being the role model or reviving “caliphate”—the medieval 
type of  statehood. Islamism has been loosely characterized with cultural 
purification, Islamic formality, anti-democratic system, intolerance to 
religious differences,  being anti-Western, and adopting violence as a means 
to gain power.31 Those groups believe that the power of Islam should be 
assembled and united as a single political entity around the world from 
Marrocco from west of Africa to Indonesia in the East.
The niqab has been formally banned by the State Islamic University 
Sunan Kalijaga Indonesia in 2017,  which sparked debates among Islamic 
organizations, Islamic scholars,  as well as human right activists who argued 
that niqab should be seen as freedom of expression and freedom of religion 
guaranteed by the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) of the United Nations.32 The university proceeds in prohibiting 
the niqab on the campus and during the learning process in the classroom 
according to the university regulation of student affairs: “Female student 
shall observe the modest outfit which is not too tight and transparence, 
30Alex, P. Schmid, “Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and 
Resistance”, The Hague, Volume 8, Number 9 (2017): 1-28.
31Bassam Tibi , Islamism and Islam, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
32Ainun Najib, “Larangan Bercadar di UIN Yogyakarta Menuai Protes”, SindoNews. Com, 
http//derah.sindonews.com, downloaded 12 December 2018.
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open face during the learning process as well as activities at the university.”33 
The ban of niqab in that university is regarded as a pioneer and valiant 
act for defending its mission as the guard of Islamic moderation, which 
aims at integrating and interconnecting between Islamic tradition and 
modern science in order to make Islam responsive and compatible with 
the rapid social transformation.  Niqab is, therefore, seen to conflict with 
moderation and advocating conservatism and extremism, which is no 
ground in the teaching of Islam. 
The social response is equally appalling where many parents were 
shocked to find that their daughters decided to observed niqab without 
their consent.  It brought a kind of social pressure onto the families in 
the neighborhood as it was stigmatized as being connected to ISIS and 
terrorist groups34. A similar reaction was documented by Susan Brenner 
when jilbab started as a new trend of Islamization and was somehow linked 
to fanatism or, as it is politically known, ‘right extremism’ as opposed to 
‘ leftist extremism’ in the New Order regime in 1980an35 Nisa noted that 
the parent’s concern on niqab: 
Includes their assumption that wearing the cadar may hinder their 
daughter’s future career and marriage prospects. One important difference 
from previous objections to wearing the jilbab is the issue of terrorism. This 
is linked to the stigma around cadari (not jilbaber or a woman who wears 
a jilbab) in Indonesia according to which they are considered as potential 
terrorists or part of terrorist networks. Therefore, parents usually ask their 
daughters not to wear the cadar when they return home to the kampung 
33UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Tata Tertib Mahasiswa, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 
2018,  10.
34Eva Nisa, “Embodied Faith: Agency and Obedience among Face-veiled University 
Students in Indonesia”,  The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, Volume 13, Number 4 (2012), 
366-381.
35Susan Brenner, “Reconstituting Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and The 
Veil”, American Ethnologist, Volume 4, Number 23 (1996),  673-697.
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(village) to prevent rumours. The most difficult moment for many parents 
is when their daughter asks their permission to quit university because the 
faculty does not accept wearing the cadar.36
Indonesia is a country with a Muslim majority population, but it took 
a long time for the hijab (Indonesia call jilbab) to be accepted willingly in 
society. Jilbab was a debate in Indonesia in the period 1970-1980. Some 
schools banned on wearing headscarves for students as stipulated in Decree 
052/C/Kep/D.82 concerning National School Uniforms on March 17, 
1982. In the early 1990s, demonstrations rejected the ban on veiling in 
schools and campuses at many prominent universities in big cities. These 
demonstrations encouraged the New Order government at that time to 
further soften its political policies toward Muslims, until February 16, 1991, 
a Decree No. 100/C /Kep/D/1991 was published, allowing students to 
wear clothes based on their beliefs 37. The rules regarding covering up the 
aurat for women are contained in many verses of the Qur’an. One of the 
most famous is QS. Al Ahzab verse 59, where the covering of the female 
aurat is referred to as the ‘hijab.’38
Scholars have a variety of interpretations on this verse when it is 
associated with Islamic clothing and the completion (kaffah). The first 
group interpreted that the entire female body, including face and hands, 
must be covered (Abul A’la al Maududy, Ibnu Abbas). The second group 
agued that the face and hands of Muslim women do not need to be covered 
(Imam Syafi’i). The third group interpreted that the face, hand, and what 
usually looks like feet for the Indonesian context do not need to be covered 
(Tarjeh Muhammadiyah). While the fourth group emphasized that the 
36Eva Nisa, “Embodied Faith”…, 372.
37Sudrajat, Jilbab di Indonesia, Antara Pelarangan dan Perjuangan 7 Mar 2018, https://news.
detik.com/berita/d-3903674/jilbab-di-indonesia-antara-pelarangan-dan-perjuangan.
38Kementrian Agama RI, Terjemahan Al Qur’an Surat  Al Ahzab ayat 59, 2019, https://
quran.kemenag.go.id/.
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important thing is to dress modestly in accordance with local culture, not 
having to cover their head/hair, let alone face (Quraish Shihab).
In some Islamic countries, the following terms are often used in reference 
to female aurat: 1) burqa, which is a garment that covers a woman’s entire 
body, including the palms and face, and the eyes are also covered by a 
thin-visible piece of cloth, usually worn by women in Afghanistan and 
some parts of Pakistan; 2) niqab, which is the covering of the entire body 
and face except the eyes—also known as the cadar in Indonesia; 3) chador, 
which is an Iranian and Pakistani traditional garment in the form of a 
loose robe covering the entire body except the face; 4) hijab/jilbab, which 
is a headcover that is separate from the other clothes, functions as a cover 
for the head, neck, and part of the chest—common in Indonesia under the 
name ‘hijab.’ Among Indonesian Muslim women, the terms are still added 
with: 5) veil/selendang, which is a scarf wrapped around the head that 
partially covers the hair and ears; and 6) long headscarves, namely clothes 
that are similar to the hijab brackets but are much longer and loose.39
According to Saba Mahmood, women’s veiling is an expression of 
piety.40 In the Indonesian context, Dewi Chandraningrum41 found that 
veiling is not only related to religion but also to politics, economy, and 
sexuality. Eva F. Nisa reveals that niqabis among university students 
struggle to reconstruct their religious identity and their capacity for 
exercising a specific type of religious agency.42 Furthermore, she found 
that parents are worried about their daughters’ decision to wear niqab. 
The veil is considered a modern construct evolving from a political and 
39Atikah Syazwani, Hijab, Burqa dan Niqab, April 2016, https://atikahsyazwani98.
wordpress.com/2016/04/05/180/.
40Saba Mahmood, Politic of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Islamic Subject, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1962.
41Dewi Chandraningrum, Negotiating Women’s Veiling, Politic & Sexulaity in Contemporary 
Indonesia, Bangkok: RASEC, 2013.
42Eva Nisa, Embodied Faith”…, 372.
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legal jurisdiction which covers diverse ethnicities, faiths, and cultures. It 
is the subject of contestation and negotiation. Identity is in ‘the constant 
making.’43 Gramsci in Larrain44 argued that collectiveness could be strongly 
upheld by a coercive measure or a hegemonic dominance, but will abruptly 
collapse.
Conducted in early 2019 in Egypt and Indonesia, this research has 
aimed at exploring the personal views of women observing niqab in the 
rise of its trends following the revival of Islamism on the global scale. It 
combines qualitative and quantitative methods. Data were collected from 
closed-ended questionnaires, life stories, semi-structured interviews, and 
focus group discussions (FGD). Selective memory and the synthesizing 
nature of life stories lead us beyond facts to their meanings, which are 
particularly useful in studies of worldview45. The life stories used here 
cover entire life-spans and additionally deal with more thematic issues 
relating to religion and niqab. The research procedure included framing 
and identifying a theoretical framework, developing research instruments, 
collecting data, reporting findings, and disseminating results. This research 
was conducted over a period of six months and its respondents represent 
niqabis, the elites in the government and civil society, and religious and 
cultural leaders from two countries, Indonesia and Egypt. This research 
was conducted collaboratively with the Dominican Institute for Oriental 
Studies in Cairo, Egypt. Closed-ended questionnaires and life stories were 
used to explore the motives, thought, and normative work relating to niqab 
and the ideal Muslim woman’s dress for Niqabis. Semi-structured interviews 
were used for the government and civil society elites and religious and 
cultural leaders in the two selected countries. Focus group discussions were 
43Bikhu Parekh , A New Politic of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
44Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, London: Hutchinson Publication, 1979.
45Furseth Inger, From Quest for Truth to Being Oneself, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006.
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implemented with civil society groups such as Islamic mass organizations 
and universities in Indonesia (Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Islamic 
State University). A total of 292 Niqabis participated (87 from Cairo and 
205 from Indonesia-Yogyakarta, NTB, Lampung, Surabaya, and Indonesia-
Cairo). There were 27 niqabis selected to sit for in-depth interviews using 
the life story technique (Cairo 6, Indonesia 14). A number of 23 figures 
participated in interviews and FGDs (6 Cairo, 17 Indonesia), including 
politicians, women activists, academics, government employees, and 
religious leaders. Data were analysed using Miles and Huberman interactive 
model: data condensation, data display, drawing and verifying conclusion46. 
To keep respondents’ confidentiality, all niqabis’ names mentioned in this 
report have been changed.
Level of Islamism and Nationalism of niqabis in Indonesia and 
Egypt
This study reveals two aspects of nationalism, namely citizenship 
belongingness and objection against democracy and three aspects of 
Islamism, including adopting Islamic caliphate and Islamic monetary 
system as well as supporting violence in defending religion. One important 
negative issue that is sometimes experienced by niqabis is the accusation 
that they are part of a terorrist network. The following findings are 
explained based on quantitative and qualitative data both from niqabis 
and prominent figures in Egypt and Indonesia.
Nationalism:  level of citizenship belongingness and objection against 
democracy
Based on the quantitative data obtained, it is highlighted that most 
niqabis demontrated their belonging to their motherland. The majority 
46Matthew B. Miles, A.M. Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña, Qualitative Data Analysis: A 
Methods Sourcebook,   Washington DC: SAGE, 2014.
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of respondents, both in Egypt and Indonesia, declared they were proud of 
being citizens in their countries. Table 1 explains that in Egypt, 89.65% of 
niqabis are proud to be Egyptian and only 3.4% say otherwise. Likewise, 
70.73% of Indonesian niqabis stated that they were proud to be Indonesian 
citizens, which means that 1 out of 3 Indonesian niqabis is not proud to 
be Indonesian citizens. 
Zia, a student in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, said that she was very proud 
of Indonesia: “If I was told to choose where I want to come from, I still 
chose Indonesia.”47 The same thing was declared by Maye, a student at 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt:
I’m very proud to be an Egyptian. Whatever happens I remain proud 
of being an Egyptian. no one can tear my pride. Egypt is the land of the 
prophets, Egypt is also referred to in the Quran. Egypt is the violin of God. 
In Egypt there is “Sina” the place where prophet Moses spoke with God. 
It`s also a beautiful place.48
Table 1 Pride to be A Citizen
Answer Egypt (n=87) Indonesia (n=205)
No Answer 6.9 2.9
Yes 89.7 70.8
No 3.4 26.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Nowadays, it is commonly considered by the general public that those 
who wear niqab are closely related to radical mindsets and political views 
that reject democracy. The second indicator that reflects nationalism is 
the perception that the government system is thaghut. Thaghut literally 
47Zia, interview (22 Nov 2018).
48Maye, interview (29 Oct 2018).
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means “exceed the limit.” This is a term in Islam that refers to anyone who 
worships other than Allah and someone who obeys those who disobey 
Allah’s commands49. Thaghut government is a system of government based 
on laws and other rules that are man-made and do not originate directly 
from the Quran, Hadith, Ijma’, and Qiyas. Table 2 hilghlited that the 
majority of the respondents do not consider that the government is thaghut. 
Egyptian Niqabis who agreed to this matter were 36.8%, which is slightly 
different from those who rejected the opinion—39.1%. In Indonesia, more 
than half of the niqabis (55.6%) do not consider the government to be a 
thaghut, while the other 39% justify this assumption.
Table 2 The Government is Thaghut
Answer Egypt (n=87) Indonesia (n=205)
No Answer 24.1 4.9
Strongly Disagree 23.0 15.6
Disagree 16.1 40.0
Agree 13.8 30.7
Strongly Agree 23.0 8.8
Total 100.0 100.0
Islamism: monetary system, caliphate, exhorting violence in defending 
religion
Islamism in this research can be revealed by the attitude toward the Islamic 
monetary system, Islamic caliphate, and violence in defending religion. 
As Bassam Tibi50 explained that one of the indicators of Islamism is the 
49Adika Mianoki, Siapakah Thaghut? (2013), https://muslim.or.id/11364-siapakah-thaghut.
html.
50Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
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rejection of the goverement system, including what is related to financial 
issues, particularly bank interests. Regarding bank interests, the majority 
of respondents agree that bank interest is haram (forbidden in Islam). 
This was agreed by 78.2% of Egyptian niqabis and 87.3% of Indonesian 
niqabis. Only 14.9% from Egypt and 11.2% from Indonesia declared that 
bank interest was acceptable (see Table 3).
Tabel 3 Bank interest is haram
Answer Egypt (n=87) Indonesia (n=205)
No Answer 6.9 1.5
Strongly Disagree 6.9 3.4
Disagree 8.0 7.8
Agree 20.7 33.7
Strongly Agree 57.5 53.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Discussions on supporting the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia and in 
Egypt are always connected with the propaganda of Hizb al-Tahrir (HT). 
The idea of  caliphate was promoted by Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an international 
political organization based in Palestine. Even though this organization has 
been banned in both Egypt and Indonesia, the ideology of the caliphate 
spread by HT still feels resonant. A prominent figure in Lombok, a lecturer 
at UIN Mataram as well as the Muhammadiyah Regional Leadership 
in Lombok, said that HTI women must wear the niqab and be ready to 
have a polygamous marriage, as part of the customs and agreements in 
that organization.51 While Jumarim, a lecturer from UIN Mataram, gave 
additional information that female HT members were mostly niqabis and 
51Sabain, interview, 17 Nov 2018.
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Islamic caliphate must be formed.52 One female activist, also a lecturer 
at UIN Mataram, Atun Wardatun, stated that: “Some people see niqabis 
clothing as radical clothing...They generally support to caliphate system... 
Not worrying about her veil, but worrying about the ideology “.53
It can be understood from Table 4 that niqabis from Egypt, 59.8% of 
respondents agree that Islam can only be upright with the caliphate system, 
while 23% reject the caliphate system. The same pattern also happened to 
Indonesian niqabis where 51.7% agree on the caliphate system, while 44.9% 
expressed their disapproval. The discussion about caliphate is usually in line 
with the discussion about the violent extremism allowed for defending religion. 
Niqabis from both countries refuse exhorting violence in the name of 
religion. Around 86.2% of Egyptian niqabis and 84.8% of Indonesian 
niqabis oppose the use of violence in defense of religion . Although they 
want the establishment of a caliphate on earth, violence is not considered 
an appropriate way of defending religion.
Tabel 4 Niqab and Politic Ideology
Answer
Islam is only upright with 
the Caliphate
Violence for 
defending religion
Egypt 
(n=87)
Indonesia 
(n=205)
Egypt 
(n=87)
Indonesia 
(n=205)
No Answer 17.2 3.4 4.6 1.0
Strongly Disagree 6.9 8.8 71.3 46.8
Disagree 16.1 36.1 14.9 38.0
Agree 26.4 34.7 6.9 10.3
Strongly Agree 33.4 17 2.3 3.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
52Jumirin, interview, 17 Nov 2018.
53Atun Wardatun, interview, 17 Nov 2018.
IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 10, Number 1, June 2020: 49-77
70
The relation between Indonesian and Egyptian niqabis and the 
transnational movement, which has a political agenda, can be explained 
by the time niqabis started wearing niqab. ISIS started influencing 
Indonesian Muslims in 2013-2014.54 There is a significant difference in the 
ages of Egyptian and Indonesian respondents regarding when they started 
wearing the niqab. In Table 5, in Egypt, most started wearing niqab in 
their teenage, which is 10-15 years (42.5%) and others, when they were 
16-21 years old (41.3%). Indonesia, on the other hand, where the niqab 
is a recent phenomenon, 65% of respondents wore the niqab in early 
adulthood, which is 16-21 years. The majority of Indonesian respondents 
claimed they started wearing the niqab in the last four years, amounting 
to 84.2%. Egyptian women who have just worn the niqab from 2015 
onwards represent 50%. 
Tabel 5 Age started wearing niqab
Answer Egypt (n=87) Indonesia (n=205)
No Answer 12.6 18.5
10-15 42.5 7.8
16-21 41.3 65
>21 4.5 8.7
Total 100.0 100.0
Niqabis is not terrorist
Niqabis in Indonesia often suffered from being labeled and suspected 
of having ties with terrorist groups. As previously mentioned by Nisa, 
the difference between Hijab and Cadar is the issue of terrorism.55 One 
54Indra Wijaya, “Bagaimana ISIS Masuk Indonesia?”, tempo.co (2014), https://nasional.
tempo.co/read/596975/bagaimana-isis-masuk-indonesia/full&view=ok.
55Eva Nisa, “Embodied Faith”…, 372.
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community leader in Lombok said, “Not all niqabis are terrorists, amid all 
captured terrorists’ wives are wearing niqab”.56 The same opinion stated 
by one of the parliement members in Egypt was that there is no direct 
connection between niqabis and terrorists, albeit the exclusive Islamic 
views among  them.57 The majority of niqabis interviewed, both Egypt 
and Indonesia, argue that the stigma that “niqabis are terrorists” is not 
true. They also deny the assumption that niqab is exclusively observed 
by women with terrorist connections. It can be explained in Table 6 that 
only 1.1% of Egyptian niqabis and 1.5% of Indonesian niqabis agree that 
niqab is often associated with terrorism. 
Tabel 6 Niqab and Terrorism
Answers
The Different between 
Niqabis and  Hijaber is 
Extremist Ideology
Terrorist Women Wear 
Niqab
Egypt
(n=87)
Indonesia 
(n=205)
Egypt
(n=87)
Indonesia
(n=205)
No Answer 3.4 4.9
Strongly Disagree 63.2 40.5 88.5 79.0
Disagree 27.6 46.8 10.3 19.5
Agree 1.1 5.9 1.1 1.5
Strongly Agree 4.6 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Similarly,  the niqabis object the perception that the main distinction 
between observing niqab and the fashionable hijab is the extreme ideology 
as previously concluded by Eva. As many as 90.8% of Egyptian and 87.3% 
56Jumirin, interview, 17 Nov 2018.
57Muhammad Abu Hamid, interview, 5 Nov 2018.
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of Indonesian respondents confirm such a misjudgment. One of the leaders 
at fatwa council (Darul Ifta) in Egypt, explained: 
Someone who thinks that wearing a niqab is terrorist is wrong ... if there 
is a police officer who catches a woman suspected of being terrorist not 
because she is wearing a niqab but because there are other evidence.58
This view might be equally shared by religious figures in Indonesia but 
many of them admitted that Niqab, especially the dark full cover, might 
be easily associated with terrorism because such an outfit was captured by 
media when jihadist groups were arrested by the police. Besides, covering 
women’s full body is the core of the doctrines among those groups.59
Conclusion
The conclusion that can be derived from the research findings concerns 
the bodily control embedded in the personal autonomy of the feminist 
narrative and how it is fiercely challenged by the fact that women in Egypt 
and Indonesia observed the Niqab in their own personal choices. In 
addition, their objection to being associated with terrorism and the stigma 
of being opposed to modernity poses another challenge. This is described 
in Mernissi’s account as the veil typifying a manifestation of misogyny 
that curbs women’s enjoyment of their rights and public participation. 
Moreover, As indicated by Jayawardena, the Muslim world turned to 
democracy and nation state in the post-colonial era, which entailed the 
concept of nationalism and governance. The research indicates that the 
view on nationalism measured from the pride of citizenship and the 
aspiration of the caliphate system varies. The caliphate system, as the core 
political struggle for the Islamists, accepted only 52% in Indonesia and 
59% in Egypt, which is lower than the common expectation that those 
58Mukhtar Muhsin, interview, 4 Nov 2018.
59Abdur Rozaki, interview, Oktober 2018.
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groups would be able to score the highest. The degree of nationalism, 
which is measured by citizens’ pride of citizenship, reveals promising 
results. Only 20% of the Indonesian, and 3% of the Egyptian, niqabis 
expressed their dissatisfaction and declared they were not proud of being 
citizens of their countries. It means that 80% to 97% of them still hold 
their strong nationalism, albeit their aspiration for the adoption of the 
caliphate system, which is just above 50%.  
Furthermore, the response to governance measured from the acceptance 
of the existing government and economic system is fragmented where the 
acceptance is around 60-73% to the existing government in contrast to 
those who view it as thaghut or not in accordance with the Islamic political 
principles—37 % in Egypt and 40% In Indonesia. The economic system 
measured from the bank interest reveals the highest response of 87% 
in Indonesia and 79% in Egypt. The objection of exhorting violence in 
the name of religion for a political end is very high in this group in both 
countries, which is a strong indication for the unwillingness to associate 
themselves with terrorism. 
The theoretical contributions of this research are placed within 
the feminist concept of ‘the personal is political’ and the concept of 
nationalism. The increasing numbers of women observing the Niqab 
while engaging in public activities can be the challenge of the initiated 
concept of ‘the personal is political’ where, in the past, women needed to 
dismantle the misogynic tradition. This is a tradition in which, Mernissi 
observes, the veil or niqab is rooted. In addition, the classic nationalism 
based on secularization poses the substantial challenge on how to adopt 
religious values in a democracy and economic system. To what extent does 
democracy accommodate religious values in its core system of inclusivity, 
protection of human rights, multiculturalism, and pluralism in the attempt 
to curb the aspiration of the caliphate system, which is theocratic and 
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exclusive in its nature. 
This study proposes two recommendations for further research on how 
to negotiate the personal autonomy as the core of the concept of ‘ the 
personal is political’ to the present rise of niqabism while safeguarding 
democracy and nationalism, which are believed to be the plausible political 
systems respecting diversity and individual rights vis-a-vis the caliphate 
system. Equally critical is how to benchmark the concept and the practice in 
how a religious-inspired political system is plausible without undermining 
the core democratic values, which prove plausible in managing nationalism 
in the plural and multi-cultural context. 
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